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A growing body of research has been directed at the human factors of Unmanned Aircraft 
System (UAS) flight operations, yet up to now, virtually no attention has been given to the 
human factors of UAS maintenance. The aim of the current research program was to identify 
the challenges facing the maintainers of small unmanned aircraft systems. Unlike their 
counterparts in conventional aviation, UAS maintenance technicians are responsible for the 
functioning of an entire system, comprising airborne and ground-based components. 
Challenges include absent or poor maintenance documentation, the need to make frequent 
decisions about salvaging components, difficulties in troubleshooting software problems, the 
maintenance of radio control model aircraft components, and the potential unfamiliarity of 
UAS maintenance personnel with the culture and practices of the aviation industry. A “dirty 
dozen” list of UAS human factors is proposed.  
 
 
Unmanned aircraft range from small inexpensive, hand-launched micro air vehicles such as micro-
electric helicopters to large, high-altitude-long-endurance vehicles such as the Global Hawk. In between these 
extremes are a vast array of vehicles and systems. As well as military applications,  unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS) have many potential non-military uses, including law enforcement, firefighting, traffic monitoring, 
aerial photography, agriculture, search and rescue, border surveillance, wildlife monitoring, power-line 
inspection, minerals exploration and homeland security activities.  At present, concerns about collision 
avoidance are holding back the operation of unmanned aircraft in civilian airspace (Flight Safety Foundation, 
2005). Assuming that this issue can be resolved, small, inexpensive unmanned aircraft may become a common 
sight.  
 
The most rapid growth in the emerging civil UAS sector may occur with small systems, defined here 
as those in which the aircraft weighs less than 100 lbs. Technological developments, such as miniaturization of 
sensor equipment and autopilot systems, and developments in battery technology, are allowing small unmanned 
aircraft to perform tasks that would have previously required large, expensive aircraft. Large unmanned 
systems are generally maintained by specialist maintenance technicians. However, small commercial UAS are 
frequently operated by generalist teams of multi-skilled individuals who perform all ground tasks including 
assembly, flight preparation, in-flight operation, and maintenance. Throughout this paper, the terms 
“maintenance personnel” or “maintainer” are used to refer to anyone who maintains a UAS, even though the 
individual also may perform other roles as a member of the UAS operating team. 
 
The nascent UAS industry has an accident rate significantly greater than that of conventional aviation 
(Williams, 2004) and human factors are emerging as major challenges to be resolved (McCarley & Wickens, 
2005; Cooke, Pringle, Pedersen & Connor, 2006). If unmanned aircraft are to be permitted to share civilian 
airspace with conventional aircraft, it will be necessary to understand the human factors associated with these 
vehicles. Rather than eliminating the potential for human error, the removal of the on-board pilot may transfer 
some of the risk of human error to personnel on the ground, including maintenance technicians. Furthermore, 
tele-operated transport systems such as unmanned aircraft may be especially vulnerable to maintenance error 
due to the absence of an on-site operator able to respond rapidly to an anomalous situation. 
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A large amount of information has been published on human factors of airline maintenance, much of it 
based on FAA-sponsored research (Johnson, 2006).  Issues such as stress, distraction, and poor access for 
maintainability are now widely identified as hazards in conventional aircraft maintenance. While recognizing 
that these issues also apply to UAS maintenance, this research was focused on issues that uniquely affect UAS 
maintenance.   
 
The research approach 
 
The objective of the research program described in this paper was to identify the human challenges in 
maintaining small UAS. For the current purposes maintenance was defined as any activity performed on the 
ground before or after flight to ensure the successful and safe operation of the system. This definition covers a 
wide range of ground-support activities including assembly, fuelling, updates to software, and pre-flight 
testing. As this was an area that had not been examined previously, the research involved the gathering of 
qualitative information that would enable broad issues to be identified. Three approaches were used to gather 
data. First, a series of site visits were made to UAS maintenance or manufacturing facilities, and UAS flight 
operations were observed. Second, structured interviews were conducted with UAS maintenance personnel. 
These interviews focused on the qualifications and skills of maintenance personnel and the challenges they face 
in the course of their work. Details of this stage of data collection can be found at Hobbs and Herwitz (2006) 
and Herwitz and Hobbs (2006). In a second round of interviews, questions focused on the specific tasks 
performed on UAS components, including ground systems such as computers. A summary of the results can be 
found in Hobbs and Herwitz, (2009).  The sections below outline some of the key differences between the job 
of UAS maintainer and that of a conventional aircraft mechanic. 
 
Emerging human factors in UAS maintenance 
 
The task of maintaining an unmanned aircraft system. A significant difference between UAS 
maintenance and conventional aircraft maintenance is that the UAS maintainer is responsible for a complete 
system, comprising the aircraft, a diverse set of ground-based equipment, and the links between these elements, 
(see Figure 1). While the aircraft may be the most obvious element of the system, the ground based elements 
also require attention and maintenance.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. In conventional aviation, the aircraft maintenance technician is responsible for the airworthiness of an 
aircraft, whereas the UAS maintenance technician is responsible for a system comprised of diverse elements, 
including the aircraft, radio transmission equipment, modems, computers, and in some cases, handheld 
controllers and launch/recovery equipment.  
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Key differences between a UAS and a conventional aircraft are: 
 
• Commercial “off the shelf” desktop or laptop computers are likely to be part of flight system. 
• System elements frequently assembled and disassembled between flights.  
• Modular construction facilitates repair by replacement and shipping of components to specialist repair 
facilities. 
• Unmanned flight is not possible without functioning avionics and/or communication equipment. 
• Some UAS components were originally intended for radio control model aircraft, and have limited 
reliability data. 
• Payload is more likely to interfere with operation of aircraft, e.g., through electromagnetic interference. 
 
Shift of risk. The introduction of unmanned aviation shifts the balance of risk in ways that must be 
understood by maintenance personnel. In conventional aviation, the safety risks associated with flight are in 
large part borne by the people who receive the benefit of flight, i.e., flight crew and passengers. Sometimes 
referred to as “shared fate,” a threat to the safety of a conventional aircraft is also a threat to the occupants of 
the aircraft.  
 
In unmanned aviation, the beneficiaries of the flight remain on the ground, and the safety risks are 
borne largely by non-involved individuals -- occupants of conventional aircraft, people under the flight path of 
the aircraft, and property owners. With no on-board lives at risk, the maintenance person is not necessarily 
conducting maintenance for the safety of specific identifiable individuals, but for the safety of the community 
as a whole. The public tends to demand especially high safety standards for technologies that are new, are not 
well understood, and where exposure to risk is involuntary (Slovic, 2000). For these reasons, there may be a 
low public tolerance of incidents involving unmanned aircraft, even when the consequences are limited to 
property damage. 
 
Diverse skill and knowledge requirements. The UAS maintainer, whether a specialist or generalist, 
requires a skill set beyond the traditional skill and knowledge requirements of aviation airframe and powerplant 
mechanics. In addition to the maintenance of an engine and airframe, a UAS technician can be expected to 
interact with computer systems, micro autopilots, radio communication equipment, modems, and, in some 
cases, satellite phones.  Ensuring the data link between the ground control station and the aircraft takes on a 
level of criticality not present in conventional aviation because the loss of communication is more likely to 
result in the loss of the aircraft. 
 
Lack of direct feedback on aircraft performance. In conventional aviation, the on-board pilot has a 
direct experience of aircraft performance via the handling qualities of the aircraft, as well as sounds, vibrations, 
and even smells. With no on-board pilot, UAS maintenance personnel lack a key source of information about 
aircraft performance. To some extent, automated in-flight monitoring provides an alternative source of detailed 
information. However automated monitoring systems can at times provide an overwhelming volume of precise 
data with relatively little consolidated information.     
 
Maintenance and fault diagnosis of IT systems. For most small UAS, the “cockpit on the ground” is a 
standard laptop or desktop computer exposed to the hazards of outdoor operations such as moisture, dust and 
temperature extremes. Computer system administration tasks now take on flight safety importance because 
system failures, such as screen lockups or software slowdowns that would be minor irritations in an office 
environment, can present significant hazards if they occur during a flight (Hobbs & Herwitz, 2008). 
 
Fault diagnosis in software-based systems can be significantly more difficult than with 
electromechanical systems.  Mysterious, ill-defined faults such as computer slowdowns, screen freezes, or 
radio frequency interference are sometimes resolved without the UAS technician understanding why the fault 
occurred, and whether their actions corrected the underlying problem or merely removed the symptoms.  
System re-boots are common responses to computer problems as illustrated in the following incident report 
(Hobbs & Herwitz, 2008). 
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“The desktop computer, which was serving as the ground control system, locked up while the 
unmanned aircraft was in flight. The PC-based computer was housed in the ground control station 
trailer. The only alternative was to re-boot the computer, and this took about two to three minutes 
before command-and-control was reestablished. The unmanned aircraft’s flight path, however, was 
already uploaded so there was no effect on the flight sequence.”  
 
Model aircraft culture. The personnel who maintain small UAS tend to have a background in radio-
controlled model aircraft or engineering, and relatively few have experience in commercial aviation 
maintenance. These personnel may possess attitudes to risk that are significantly different to those held by 
qualified aircraft maintenance technicians. For example, they may be accustomed to operating without formal 
procedures or checklists, and may be unfamiliar with the ethics and standard practices of aircraft maintenance. 
 
Task performance in the absence of documentation. Document design has been identified as a critical 
performance shaping factor in conventional aviation maintenance (Drury, Sarac, & Driscoll, 1997).   Small UA 
generally have rudimentary flight manuals, however many are delivered without maintenance documentation. 
Users generally develop their own maintenance checklists and procedures to guide routine tasks such as system 
assembly, and scheduled pre-flight checks. However, for troubleshooting and corrective maintenance, 
maintainers may have no choice but to rely on “knowledge in the head” or “trial and error”.  
 
Salvage decisions. Compared to conventional aircraft, small unmanned aircraft are more likely to 
experience damage caused by events such as hard landings, contact with water, or landing in trees. Unmanned 
aircraft also tend to be less waterproof than conventional aircraft leading to a greater chance of water damage to 
internal components. To a greater extent than in conventional aviation, UAS maintenance personnel will be 
required to make judgments about the salvage, testing and re-use of components from damaged UA. In the case 
of modular aircraft designs, an apparently undamaged modular unit may have an unseen defect.  
 
Repetitive assembly and handling. In contrast to conventional aircraft, most small unmanned systems 
are designed to be reassembled and disassembled before and after each flight, necessitating the frequent 
connection and disconnection of electrical, fuel and data systems. The probability of an error during a single 
connection task may be relatively low, in the order of 0.001 (Kirwan, 1994). However UAS maintenance 
personnel are exposed to this risk on a regular basis, and consequently the chance of an assembly error or 
maintenance-induced damage may become significant over the course of months or years. The following 
example illustrates an assembly error involving a small hand-launched unmanned aircraft: 
 
“After departure the unmanned aircraft performed unusually slow rates of turn to the right and tight 
turns to the left and struggled to track as designated by the operator. Approximately seven minutes 
into the flight, the outboard section of the right wing separated from the centre wing section. The 
aircraft immediately entered a rapid clockwise spiral before impacting the ground. The most likely 
explanation for the crash was that the outboard section of the right wing was incorrectly attached 
during pre-flight assembly and from launch it flew with difficulty until the wing section eventually 
separated.” (Hobbs & Herwitz, 2008). 
 
Risk associated with maintenance or disturbance of ground equipment while missions are underway. 
The cockpit of a conventional aircraft is beyond the reach of maintenance personnel once the aircraft is in 
flight. In contrast, the ground station of a UAS is always accessible to maintenance personnel on the ground. 
They  may be required to perform corrective maintenance while a flight is underway, or may carry out other 
actions that could potentially impact system performance. For example, an in-flight problem may require 
troubleshooting of ground equipment, the checking of cables, or a re-start of the ground control computer. A 
maintenance technician interacting with a live system requires a clear understanding of the operational 
implications of the planned intervention. The technician must also consider the potential effects of errors, 
whether mistakes such as misdiagnosing a fault, or simple slips such as tripping over a cable. Even a brief 
interruption to a computer’s power supply can have an extended impact if it leads to a slow re-boot sequence.  
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Conclusion 
 
Technological developments have increased the capabilities of unmanned aircraft systems to the point 
where they can now potentially serve a large range of non-military purposes. Despite the absence of an on-
board pilot, human factors are emerging as key issues in this sector. As automation decreases the role of 
humans as direct physical controllers of unmanned aircraft, it is possible that maintenance and other ground-
support activities will become increasingly important.  
 
The maintenance of unmanned aircraft systems introduces a new set of human factors in addition to 
those that apply in conventional aviation maintenance. The “Dirty Dozen” list has been widely used to educate 
airline maintenance technicians about human factors (Dupont, 1997). Table 1 contains a proposed “UAS Dirty 
Dozen” intended to raise awareness of the emerging maintenance human factors in small UAS operations. Each 
of the 12 issues is illustrated with an example of a dangerous attitude or situation. This list will be updated as 
more is learned about this topic. 
 
Table 1: A “Dirty Dozen” for small UAS maintenance.  
Issue Example 
1. Mysterious software faults I don’t know why the software did that. I’ll just re-boot it.   
I’ll just swap the card. 
2. Lack of checklists for routine tasks I don’t need a checklist, I do this procedure all the time. 
3. Assembly and handling I’ve assembled this system hundreds of times. 
4. Laptop maintenance Need to check your email? Use the ground control 
laptop. 
5. Awareness of risk to public No-one’s life is at stake here. 
6. Salvage decisions We can re-use that component, it doesn’t look damaged. 
7. Payload interference with aircraft This is just a small change to the payload 
8. End-to-end connectivity All the individual components are working, I guess it will 
work when we connect it all up. 
9. Disclosure and sharing of information I don’t want my competitors to know about this problem.  
I don’t want the FAA to find out. 
10. Trial and error repair and troubleshooting Not sure how this goes back, but that looks right. 
11. Frequency management No one else seems to be using this frequency. 
12. Disturbance of ground equipment during 
flight 
Let’s move the ground control computer into the shade.  
 
 
Confidential reporting systems such as NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) have been 
valuable sources of human factors information in conventional aviation. The emerging UAS industry, where 
safety issues are least understood, lacks a confidential incident reporting system. Any future UAS reporting 
system must include maintenance personnel. In the course of discussions with UAS operators, it became 
apparent that concerns about commercial confidentiality and FAA enforcement action are currently suppressing 
the open disclosure of incidents, which in turn may make it difficult for the UAS industry to learn from 
experience.    
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This research was funded by the FAA under inter-agency agreement DTFA01-01-X-02045 between 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Human Factors Research and Engineering Division and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aeronautical Safety and Human Factors. We would 
like to thank the many UAS operators and maintainers who agreed to be interviewed. We also acknowledge the 
assistance provided by Maj. Keirin Joyce of the Australian Defence Force. 
 
24
 
 
References 
 
Cooke, N. J., Pringle, H.L. Pedersen, H.K & Connor, O. (Eds.). (2006). Human factors of remotely operated 
vehicles.  San Diego: Elsevier. 
 
Drury, C., Sarac, A, & Driscoll, D. (1997). Documentation design aid development. Phase 4 progress report. 
Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration. (http://hfskyway.faa.gov). 
 
Dupont, G. (1997). The Dirty Dozen Errors in Maintenance. Proceedings of Eleventh Federal Aviation 
Administration Meeting on Human Factors Issues in Aircraft Maintenance and Inspection. 
Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration/Office of Aviation Medicine. 
(http://hfskyway.faa.gov) 
 
Flight Safety Foundation. (2005, May). See what’s sharing your airspace. Flight Safety Digest, 24, (5), 1–26. 
 
Herwitz, S., & Hobbs, A. (2006).  A Review of the Resources and Facilities Required to Conduct Maintenance 
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Report to Federal Aviation Administration under inter-agency 
agreement DTFA01-01-X-02045. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. 
 
Hobbs, A., & Herwitz, S. (2006). Human challenges in the maintenance of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Report 
to Federal Aviation Administration under inter-agency agreement DTFA01-01-X-02045. Moffett 
Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. 
 
Hobbs, A., & Herwitz, S. (2008). Maintenance challenges of small unmanned aircraft systems. - A human 
factors perspective. Final report to Federal Aviation Administration under inter-agency agreement 
DTFA01-01-X-02045. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. 
 
Johnson, W. B. (2006, September). Keeping it real with maintenance human factors at FAA. Overhaul and 
Maintenance, 26. 
 
Kirwan, B. (1994).  A practical guide to human reliability assessment.  London: Taylor & Francis. 
 
McCarley, J. S., & Wickens, C. D. (2005). Human factors implications of UAVs in the national airspace. 
Technical Report AHFD-05-05/FAA-05-01.  Atlantic City, NJ: Federal Aviation Administration. 
 
Slovic, P. (2000). The perception of risk. London: Earthscan. 
 
Williams, K.W. (2004). A summary of unmanned aircraft accident/incident data: human factors implications. 
Technical Report No. DOT/FAA/AM–04/24. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Aerospace Medicine. 
 
 
 
                                                 
* alan.hobbs@nasa.gov 
25
